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ABSTRACT
Remittances have been promoted as a development tool because they can
raise incomes and reduce poverty rates in developing countries. Remittances may also promote development by providing funds that recipients
can spend on education or health care or invest in entrepreneurialactivities. From a macroeconomic perspective, remittances can boost aggregate
demand and thereby GDP as well as spur economic growth. But, remittances may also have adverse macroeconomic impacts by increasing income i.nequality and reducing labor supply among recipients. We used
state-level data from Mexico during 2003-2007 to examine the aggregate
effect of remittances on employment, wages, unemployment rates, the wage
distribution, and school enrollment rates. Our results suggest that while
employment, wages, and school enrollment have risen over time in Mexican states, increasing remittances do not account for these trends. But, remittances may lessen some measures of income inequality. Two-stage least
squares specifications among central Mexican states suggest that remittances shift the wage distributionto the right, reducing the fraction of workers earning the minimum wage or less.

THE

U.S. recession that began in late 2007 and the housing bust

that preceded it reduced migration flows from Mexico to the
United States and remittance flows back to Mexico. Mexican

is the contact author. The views expressed here are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the
Federal Reserve System.
**Pia M. Orrenius, Ph.D., is a Research Officer and Senior Economist at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas and Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA);
pia.orrenius@dal.frb.org. Madeline Zavodny, Ph.D., is a Professor of Economics
at Agnes Scott College and IZA; mzavodny@agnesscott.edu. Jes~is Cafias is an
Associate Economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, El Paso Branch;
jesus.canas@dal.frb.org. Roberto Coronado, Ph.D. is an Economist at the Federal
Rcscrve Bank of Dallas, El Paso Branch; robcrto.coronado@dal.frb.org.
*Orrenius

803

804

LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 16

policymakers grew concerned about the effects of a reduction in money
transfers at a time when economic growth was also slowing. Policymakers
worried that incomes and consumption would fall in the short run and
long-run economic development would be hampered if lower remittances
reduced school enrollment. The large literature on remittances, however,
may reduce Mexican policymakers' concerns about the decline in remittances. The literature has reached mixed conclusions on the effect of remittances on economic development in receiving areas.
The remittances that migrants send back home create both costs and
benefits for a country. On the positive side, remittances boost the incomes of recipients, enabling them to increase consumption and investment. But, some of the positive income effect may be offset by exchange
rate and price effects. In addition, remittances can slow economic development by exacerbating income inequality and reducing labor supply
among recipient families. This study examines the effect of remittances
on economic development as measured by employment, unemployment,
wages, wage inequality, and school enrollment in Mexican states during
the period 2003-2007.
Since remittances have become a major source of income for many developing countries, there is a large and fast-growing economics literature
on the effects of remittances on receiving countries. We focus here on
studies specific to Mexico.' Previous research has reached mixed conclusions about the effects of remittances on labor force participation, inequality, poverty, schooling, and financial markets in Mexico.
Findings on the effect of remittances on labor supply in Mexico are
mixed. Hanson finds that, after controlling for observable characteristics,
individuals are less likely to participate in the labor force if their house2
hold has sent migrants abroad or has received remittances from abroad .
He also concludes that during the 1990s, a time of high migration, women
from high-migration states became less likely to work outside the home
than women from low-migration states .3 This suggests that remittances
might reduce labor supply among those remaining in Mexico, although
the effect could be due to migration instead. In contrast, Cox-Edwards
and Rodriguez-Oreggia find no systematic difference in labor force behavior between households that receive remittances and those that do
1. For recent surveys that are not specific to Mexico, see e.g., Hillel Rapoport & Fr6d~ric Docquier, The Economics of Migrants' Remittances, in 2 HANDBOOK ON THECON. Oj, GIVING, RtiCIPROCITY & At TriUISM 1135, (Serge-Christophe Koim &
Jean Mercier Ythier eds., 2006); Richard H. Adams, Jr., InternationalRemittances
and the Household: Analysis & Review of Global Evidence, 15 J. AFiR. ECON. 396
(2006).
2. Gordon H. Hanson, Emigration, Remittances & Labor Force Participationin Mexico (Inst. for the Integration of Latin Am. and the Caribbean, Working Paper No.
28, 2007); see also Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes & Susan Pozo, Remittance Income
Volatility & Labor Supply in Mexico (2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTINTERNATIONAL/Resource/1 5728461253029981787/6437326-12530301 258l8/A mu edo-Doran tes-Pozo. pdf (finding that
labor supply also responds to the volatility in remittances).
3. See Hanson, supra note 2.
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not. 4
Likewise, there is no clear consensus regarding the impact of remittances on income inequality. Some research suggests that the relationship between remittances (and migration) and inequality is an inverse-U
shape, with inequality first increasing as migration and remittances rise
from relatively low levels.5 Inequality eventually falls as higher levels of
migration expand networks and drive down migration costs and as remittances rise, allowing lower-income families to migrate and share in the
benefits. Other studies conclude that the net effect of migration and remittances is to exacerbate income inequality 6 while some find no evidence that remittances affect inequality.7
For the Mexican case, previous research suggests that remittances increase income inequality. For instance, Mora Rivera shows that international remittances increase the Gini coefficient-a measure of
inequality-in rural Mexican communities. 8 But, he concludes that domestic remittances, from workers moving within Mexico, reduce the Gini
coefficient. 9 These differing impacts could be driven by migrant selection. If domestic migrants are from the lower end of the income distribution, their migration should boost incomes among poor households,
reducing income disparities rather than increasing them.
Previous studies have also addressed the question of whether remittances reduce poverty. Most research concludes that remittances do reduce poverty rates, albeit perhaps modestly in some countries.' 0 For the
Mexican case. Esquivel and Huerta-Pineda indicate that receiving remittances reduces the likelihood of being in poverty by ten to fourteen percent.'" L6pez-C6rdova shows that the fraction of households receiving
remittances is negatively associated with the poverty rate across all Mexi4. Alejandra Cox-Edwards & Eduardo Rodriguez-Oreggia, Remittances & Labor
Force Participationin Mexico: An Analysis Using Propensity Score Matching, 37
WORLD1 DEV. 1004, 1012 (2009).
5. Valeria Koechlin & Gianmarco Leon, InternationalRemittances & Income Inequality: An Empirical Investigation, 10 J. ECON. Poi. 'v & Rio~m 123 (2007); David
McKenzie & Hillel Rapoport, Network Effects & the Dynamics of Migration and
Inequality: Theory & Evidence from Mexico, 84 J. Du--v. ECON. 1, 3 (2007).
6. See e.g., Bradford Barham & Stephen Boucher, Migration, Remittances, & Inequality; Estimatingthe Net Effects of Migration on Income Distribution,55 J. Divi-_i ot,
on
ING, ECON. 307, 309 (1998); United Nations Expert Group Meeting
international Migration and Development, New York, N.Y., July 6-8, 2005, The
Impact of Migration & Remittances on Distributionand Sources Income: The Mexican Rural Case, U.N. Doc. UNIPOPIMIG2005O6 (June 27, 2005) (Jos6 Jorge
Mora Rivera) [hereinafter The Mexican Rural Case].
7. See Pablo Acosta et al., What Is the Impact of InternationalRemittances on Poverty
& Inequality in Latin America?, 36 Wom..iD Di--v. 89, 90 (2007).
8. The Mexican Rural Case, supra note 6.
9. Id.
10. See Richard H. Adams & John Page, Do International Migration & Remittances
Reduce Poverty in Developing Countries?, 33 Woirn o: DF-v. 1645 (2005); see also
Acosta, supra note 7.
11. Gerardo Esquivel & Alejandra Huerta-Pineda, Remittances & Poverty in Mexico:
A Propensity Score Matching Approach, 27 INTE-GRAri1ON & TRADE. J. 45, 57
(2007).
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can municipalities in the year 2000.12
The impact of remittances on education may be particularly important
for economic development in the long-run. Most research finds evidence
of a positive effect of remittances on Mexican education outcomes. Hanson and Woodruff suggest that living in a household with a U.S. migrant
increases years of schooling among girls whose parents have low educa-

tion levels.' 3 Remittance inflows raise household income and relax credit
constraints, which may enable families to pay school fees and delay girls'
entry into the labor force. Borraz finds a positive but small effect of remittances on schooling, with the impact only occurring for children living
in cities with fewer than 2,500 inhabitants and whose mothers have a very
low level of education.' 4 L6pez-C6rdova shows that the fraction of
households receiving remittance income is positively associated with
school attendance rates and negatively associated with child illiteracy
rates across Mexican municipalities in year 2000.15
1. RECENT TRENDS IN THE MEXICO CASE
The effect of remittances on economic development in Mexico is of
particular interest because the country has experienced a staggering outflow of workers and large remittance inflows. About eight million people-over fifteen percent of the Mexican-born labor force-have
migrated to the United States in recent years. There is considerable controversy about the relative skill level of these emigrants, with some studies contending that out-migrants are drawn from the bottom of the skill
distribution' 6 and others suggesting that they are from the top half or
middle of the skill distribution. 1 7 Having grown at double-digit rates for
many years, remittances to Mexico reached an all-time high of almost $24
billion in 2007, occupying third place as a foreign exchange generator for
Mexico after oil and maquiladora exports.
The traditional migrant-sending regions of Mexico, primarily the central states, benefit disproportionately from remittances, as shown in Figure 1.
12. Ernesto L6pez-C6rdova, Globalization, Migration, & Development The Role of
Mexican Migrant Remittances, 6 ECONOMIA 217, 226-28 (2005).
13. Gordon H. Hanson & Christopher Woodruff, Emigration & Educational Attainment in Mexico, (Univ. of Cal., San Diego, Working Paper, 2003).
14. Fernando Borraz, Assessing the Impact of Remittances on Schooling: The Mexican
Experience, 5 GLOBAL, ECON. J. 1, 2 (2005).
15. L6pez-C6rdova, supra note 12, at 234-39.
16. Pablo Ibarraran & Darren Lubotsky, Mexican Immigration & Self-Selection: New
U.S.
Evidence from the 2000 Mexican Census, in MEXICAN IMMIG;RATION -1- -1-1-IF
159, 161 (2007).
17. See Daniel Chiquiar & Gordon H. Hanson, InternationalMigration, Self-Selection,
& the Distribution of Wages:, Evidence from Mexico and the United States, 113 J.
Poj. ECON. 239, 268 (2005); see also Pia M. Orrenius & Madeline Zavodny, Selfselection Among Undocumented Immigrants from Mexico, 78 J. DEivi-l-OPINO
ECON. 215, 217 (2005).
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FIGURE 1: REMITTANCES AS A SHARE OF STATE GDP
IN MEXICO
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Source: Banco de Mexico; INEGI.
Note: State remittances are divided by state GDP (2008 data).

The poorer central-western states attract most of the remittance flows,
with Michoacdin at the top with almost $2.5 billion in 2008 (or 10% of
gross state product, or GSP), followed by Guanajuato with $2.3 billion
(6.1% of GSP), Estado de Mexico with $2.1 billion (2.2% of GSP) and
Jalisco with $1.9 billion (3.0% of GSP). In richer regions, such as Distrito
Federal or the northern Mexican states of Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Nuevo Le6n, Coahuila and Tamaulipas, remittances are less than
two percent of GSP and play a much smaller role in the state economy.
Thbis study examines the effect of remittance inflows on several indicators of economic development at the state level in Mexico, an approach
that complements the existing literature that mainly uses data at the
household level. As discussed below, studying remittances and development at the state level captures the net effect of transfers across recipient
and non-recipient households, an effect that household-level studies do
not capture. In addition, if remittances are better measured at more aggregate levels than at the household level, using state-level data reduces
measurement error and enhances estimates of remittance effects. Using
state-level data also reduces concerns about unobserved heterogeneity
and selection bias, which are difficult problems to address at the household level. We control for any remaining endogeneity by instrumenting
for remittances using migrant-weighted U.S. wages and unemployment
rates. The two-stage least squares results suggest that remittances shift
the wage distribution to the right, shrinking the share of lowest-wage
workers, but do not boost school enrollment rates. Remittances also appear to be weakly negatively related to unemployment rates, but we do
not find significant effects on median wages or employment.
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11.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Remittances are likely to affect wages and employment both at the
household level and in the aggregate. If leisure is a normal good, remittances should reduce labor supply among recipient households by creating a pure income effect. 1 8 Although this reduction in labor supply
partially offsets the positive income impact of remittances, the net increase in income should cause the aggregate demand curve to shift out,
resulting in higher GDP. The increase in aggregate demand and the reduction in labor supply from recipient families should both boost wages,
which will lure some members of non-recipient families into the labor
force. While remittances should cause wages to rise, the skill levels and
hence the wages of non-recipients may be lower than those of recipients.
If so, compositional changes could mask the wage effect by causing the
average wage to fall even though workers earn higher wages. Meanwhile,
the net effect of higher remittances on employment and unemployment
rates is ambiguous-it depends on the relative magnitude of the changes
in labor supply among recipient and non-recipient households and on labor demand.
Remittances are also likely to have distributional effects. The income
distribution changes if there is selection in which households receive remittances or if remittances alter the wage distribution. Suppose, for example, that remittances are primarily received by households in the
middle of the income distribution. Concomitant reductions in labor supply from these households should first and foremost raise wages for similar workers; relative wages at the bottom and top ends of the skill
distribution could rise or fall, depending on the degree of substitutability
of workers of different skill levels. If remittances help recipients invest in
businesses, as might be the case in the presence of credit constraints,
there might be further distributional effects.
In multi-sector models with flexible exchange rates, remittances drive
up the exchange rate and reallocate activity away from tradable sectors
into non-tradable sectors as home country exports become less competitive. Workers in non-tradable sectors thus may benefit at the expense of
workers in tradable sectors. In sum, the net impact of remittances on the
income and wage distributions is theoretically ambiguous.
All of these predictions-or lack thereof-ignore any direct effects of
the out-migration that is a necessary precondition for remittances. Holding remittances constant, out-migration should boost wages as workers
move abroad. Indeed, research finds a significant positive correlation between Mexican wages and out-migration. 1 9 In addition, the distribution
of wages may change, depending again on whether emigrants are drawn
18. Demand increases with income for a normal good. If leisure is a normal good,
demand for leisure increases with income, necessitating a decrease in labor because of the labor-leisure tradeoff.
19. See Hanson, supra note 2; Prachi Mishra, Emigration & Wages in Source Countries:

Evidence from Mexico, 82 J. oi,

DE-VEL OPING ECON.

180 (2007).
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from a particular segment of the skill or wage distribution and on the
degree of substitutability of workers of different skill levels. Some research suggests that relative wages for low-skilled workers have fallen in
Mexico as a result of out-migration .2 0 U~nemployment rates may rise or
fall, depending on whether out-migrants were unemployed, while employment rates almost surely rise because the population is falling.
If households face binding credit constraints, remittances may boost
investment in both human and physical capital. Evidence for Mexico suggests that remittances may relax credit constraints for the very poor and
can lead to more child schooling. 21 But, migration may confound the positive effect of remittances on education. 22 Children who anticipate migrating to the United States in the future have less incentive to
accumulate education given that the return to education is lower in the
United States than in Mexico.
A.

ADVANTAGES

OF

STATE-LEVEL ANALYSIS

Remittances have been linked to a host of beneficial outcomes, such as
lower poverty, greater investment in education and health, and increased
entrepreneurial activity. Most of these linkages have been made by comparing recipient to non-recipient households in household-level data, although some studies also compare countries. This study takes a different
approach by examining the effect of remittances over time at the state
level.
The advantage of state-level analysis is first and foremost that all formal transfers are captured by the data.2 3 Household surveys in Mexico
typically capture only about one-third of the official volume of international remittances. 2 4 The volume and growth rate of official remittances
to Mexico are much higher than those implied by household survey data
from senders and receivers and by other measures, such as U.S.-Mexico
remittance estimates supplied by the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Also, the remittance impact is not limited to recipients. When remittances are large, as is the case in some Mexican states, non-recipients are
affected by ensuing changes in labor and capital markets. State-level
analysis can capture these indirect, general equilibrium effects.
An additional advantage of state-level analysis is that concerns about
endogeneity bias are smaller than in household-level studies because the
20. Abdurrahamn Ayedmir & George J. Borjas, Cross-Country Variation in the Impact
of International Migration: Canada, Mexico, & the United States, 5 J. ol, EuRoPEAN ECON. AsS'N 663 (2007).
21. See Borraz, supra note 14, at 7; Hanson, supra note 13.

22. David McKenzie & Hillel Rapoport, Migration & Education Inequality in Rural
Mexico (Inst. for the Integration of Latin Am. & the Caribbean, Working Paper
No. 23, 2006).
23. Note that we examine only remittances sent from abroad, not repatriated funds
brought back by returning migrants or domestic remittances from rural-urban
migration.
24. See Jesus Caflas, Roberto Coronado & Pia M. Orrenius, Explaining the Increase in
Remittances to Mexico, 4 SOUTHWEST ECON. 3 (2007).
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remittance impact is measured across all households, not just recipient
families. At the household level, both remittances and migration are
likely to be endogenous with respect to outcomes of interest. Migration
and remittances are often a response to household needs and priorities,
so the causality runs both ways. For example, do remittances improve
schooling outcomes, or are families who want to invest in schooling more
likely to send a member abroad who will remit funds? McKenzie and
Sasin note the "pervasive endogeneity" in such household-level decisions
and urge using differences or instrumental variables techniques to control
25
for bias arising from reverse causality, selection, and omitted variables.
Moreover, the confounding effects of migration make the remittance
impact hard to study at the household level at a single point in time.
Children may leave school to fill in for a father when he migrates. The
remittances he eventually sends back may allow the children to return to
school. Therefore, there might be no net change in children's educational
attainment. Time-varying data of the kind we use here can also better
capture the effect of remittances than most household surveys, which
tend to be cross-sectional.
In addition to the literature using household-level data to measure the
impact of remittances, studies have also used cross-country data to examine the effect of remittances on economic variables like GDP, income
inequality, and poverty. Such studies typically pool cross-sectional or
time-series data on a number of countries either around the world or in a
certain geographic area, such as Latin America. 2 6 Using time-series data
allows such studies to include country fixed effects to control for timeinvariant, unobservable differences across countries. We implicitly take a
similar approach by comparing states within a single country. The advantage here is that states are more economically, culturally, and geographically similar than different countries. Examining states within a single
country gives the advantages of time-varying data in cross-national studies while removing potential problems arising from country-specific
changes over time that are difficult to model empirically, such as changes
in political regime or enforcement of property rights.
Using state-level data may lessen concerns about unobservable heterogeneity between recipient and non-recipient (or migrant and non-migrant) households but does not completely mitigate all endogeneity or
selection problems. As in the household case, reverse causality may be a
problem since both migration and remittances are likely to depend on
macroeconomic conditions. Our use of state fixed effects reduces such
concerns about endogeneity bias. In addition, we implement a two-stage
least squares (2SLS) specification where we instrument for remittances
using migrant-weighted measures of U.S. wages and unemployment rates
25. David McKenzie & Marcin J. Sasin. Migration, Remittances, Poverty, & Human
Capital: Conceptual & Empirical Challenges (The World Bank, Working Paper
No. 4272, 2007).
26. See Acosta, supra note 7, at 9.
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from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and wages from the Covered
Employment and Wages (CEW) data. Previous research has used U.S.
earnings and unemployment to instrument for remittances. 2 7
111.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A.

DATA

Our measure of remittances is the state breakdown of Mexican remittances produced quarterly by the Banco de M6xico since 2003. In 2000,
Banco de M6xico launched a major overhaul of the collection and recording of remittance data. Efforts initially focused on better recordkeeping
within the central bank and then on better collection from sources
outside the bank. 2 8 To this end, in October 2002, Banco de Mexico issued
rules under which all banks and money transfer companies had to register
with the central bank and report monthly remittances by Mexican state of
destination. Before 2003, state remittances were not available and aggregate monthly remittance levels were inferred from reporting based on a
1990 census of financial institutions, money exchange houses, and wire
transfer companies. The reporting requirement led to much improved
data collection and a clear break with past trends in remittance numbers.
Figure 2 shows remittances to Mexico (in real U.S. dollars, deflated using
the CPI-W) on a quarterly basis during the period 2000-2007. After the
reporting requirement begins in 2003, the data show more rapid growth
and greater seasonality. Of course, despite the improved statistics, official remittance flows are still an undercount since unrecorded remittances
continue to occur through informal channels.
We merge quarterly state-level remittances with quarterly state-level
data on employment, unemployment, and median wages per hour from
Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacion y Empleo or ENOE (in real pesos, deflated using regional Mexican CPI). ENOE captures all employment,
both formal and informal. It is important to have a direct measure of
employment and wages based on all workers, since research suggests that
remittances have a large impact on the informal sector, and this impact
may differ from the effect on the formal sector if formal sector workers
are less likely to be migrants. 29 In addition, the formal sector in Mexico
accounts for less than half of total employment. We also include statelevel measures of quarterly real foreign direct investment (FDI) and annual labor force-formal plus informal-as control variables.
While our analysis of wages, employment, and unemployment is conducted at the quarterly level, we use annual data on school enrollment
27. See, e.g., Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes et al., Migration, Remittances & Children's
Schooling in Haiti, (The inst. For the Study of Labor, Working Paper No. 3657,
2008).
28. Jesus Cervantes, Improving Central Bank Reporting & Procedures on Remittances
1-2 (May 11, 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
29. Jose Brambila Macias, Remittances, Migration & Informality in Mexico. A Simple
Model 16 (Mar. 31, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
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FIGURE 2: REMITTANCES TO MEXICO, 2000-2007
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Source: Banco de Mexico; Bureau of Labor Statistics; authors' own calculations.
Note: Remittances are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and deflated using the U.S. CPI-W
(millions of 2007 dollars).

and the wage distribution. For that portion of the analysis, we merge
annual remittances with enrollment rates and measures of the wage distribution. The enrollment rates are measured at the primary, secondary,
tertiary, and vocational ('technical') school levels. The wage distribution
measures are the fractions of workers earning less than or equal to the
national minimum wage, one to two times the minimum wage, two to
three times the minimum wage, three to five times the minimum wage,
and more than five times the minimum wage. Descriptive statistics are
shown in Table 1 and data details and sources are listed in Appendix Table 1. All quarterly variables are seasonally adjusted with the exception
of remittances; the state remittance series is currently too short (only
twenty observations per state) to run a seasonal adjustment. As discussed below, we include time fixed effects in the regressions, which
should help control for any remaining seasonality.
B.

METHODS

We take a simple approach to examining the effect of remittances on
measures of economic development within Mexican states. We regress a
quarterly or annual state-level measure of economic development on real
remittances received in that state. We also control for FDI and the size of

2010]
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Mean
Remittances (millions of real U.S. $)
Employment (in 000s)
Wage, median (real pesos per hour)
Unemployment rate
Labor force (in 000s)
FD1 (millions of real U.S. $)
Percent of all workers earning minimum wage or less
Percent of all workers earning 1-2 times minimum wage
Percent of all workers earning 2-3 times minimum wage
Percent of all workers earning 3-5 times minimum wage
Percent of all workers earning above 5 times minimum wage
Enrollment rate (primary school)
Enrollment rate (secondary school)
Enrollment rate (university)
Enrollment rate (technical school)
U.S. weekly wage, CEW
U.S. weekly wage, CPS
U.S. unemployment rate

S.D.

164.70
156.70
1289.59 1111.56
16.39
4.03
3.27
1.31
1338.46 1168.46
165.18
573.19
17.14
9.73
25.54
5.33
23.84
5.03
20.61
5.26
12.87
5.22
94.93
3.66
59.33
8.80
3.88
0.90
2.0
0.94
885.50
77.33
617.32
24.28
5.42
0.76

High

Low

694.96
5798.13
31.00
7.20
6023.99
8278.44
49.51
35.70
33.83
35.87
29.93
106.20
94.51
6.76
5.71
1328.3
679.80
7.10

4.08
204.27
6.93
0.40
212.02
-293.13
1.75
9.71
9.32
8.67
4.31
88.73
40.23
2.14
0.70
675.63
556.82
3.05

Note: Shown are descriptive statistics for quarterly state-level remittances, employment,
unemployment rate, hourly wages, FDI, and U.S. wages and unemployment rate. Labor force, wage
distribution and school enrollment rates are annual. Data details and sources are described in
Appendix Table 1 below. The data span 2003-2007.

the labor force. 30 We use the natural log of the dependent variable in the
employment and wage regressions, while other outcomes (unemployment
rate, wage distribution, and enrollment rates) are expressed as percentages. Specifications include state fixed effects and, in some cases, time
fixed effects:
Econ Dev,, = a + P3Remittances,, + yFDI,, + (PLF,, + a, +

T, +

,

(1

where s indexes states and t indexes time (which is either quarterly or
annual, depending on the dependent variable). We estimate HuberWhite standard errors clustered on the state.
This simple specification has several advantages. In the fixed effects
models, the state effects control for unobservable differences that are
fixed over time, such as distance from the U.S. border, while the time
fixed effects control for changes that are common to states, such as

changes in the U.S. or Mexican

economny. 3 1

Ideally we would also control

for time-varying, state-level measures of economic conditions that affect
30. Although quarterly labor force is available at the state level, we use annual average labor force as a control variable. This allows us to focus on the quarterly
variation in the components of labor force, namely employment and unemployment, and relate those to changes in remittances.
31. We also tried specifications controlling for state-specific time trends in addition to
state and time fixed effects, but the trends wiped-out all the results. The time
series is presumably too short (only five years) and does not have the necessary
power to estimate trends in addition to the other coefficients, particularly with
regard to the annual data. Including state trends produces little change in goodness of fit of the regressions as measured by adjusted R', which is already 0.99
when the state and time fixed effects are included.
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the outcomes of interest but are not end ogenous or affected by remittances, but aside from FDI and labor force, there are no such variables
for which data are readily available. Because there are likely to be larger
effects of remittances in high-migration states, we limit the sample to
high-migration central Mexican states in some specifications .3 2 Any general equilibrium effects of remittances are more likely to appear in this
sample, where spillover effects should be large.
Endogeneity bias is a concern because remittances may increase in response to economic hardship at home. We address the dual causality by
using U.S. wages and unemployment rates as instrumental variables for
remittances. Instruments must be correlated with remittances but not
with other Mexican economic development indicators and should vary by
Mexican state and over time. Measures of U.S. economic conditions will
he correlated with migrants' earning power in the United States and
hence their ability to send remittances, but are unlikely to be related to
the measures of Mexican economic development we study. To map U.S.
wages and unemployment rates to Mexican states, we use the location
choices of Mexican migrants who are in the Mexican Migration Project
(MMP), a long-running survey of Mexican households that collects retrospective data on individuals' migration spells.3 3 We construct time-invariant weights based on the recent migration histories of MMP household
members 3 4 and multiply these weights by a measure of the wage from
either the Current Population Survey (CPS) or the Quarterly Census of
Employment and Wages (CEW) and with state-level unemployment rates
from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 3 5 Hence, the U.S. wage (unemployment rate) for Mexican state i at time t is simply the share of workers
from i who are in U.S. state]j multiplied by a measure of wages (unemployment rate) in U.S. state]j at time t summed over all U.S. states and
the District of Columbia:
32. The high-migration, central-Mexico sample drops the following states: Baja California Norte, Baja California Sur, Campeche, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Nuevo Le6n,
Quer~taro, Sonora, Tabasco, Tamaulipas, and Yucat~in.
33. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo use the same methodology to construct an instrument
for household-level remittances in Mexico. We tried using wages reported in
MMP as an instrument but there are too few observations in 2003-2007 to construct a state-specific earnings measure. See Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes & Susan
Pozo, New Evidence on the Role of Remittances on Health Care Expenditures by
Mexican Households, (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Working Paper No. 4617,
2009), availableat http://ftp.iza.org/dp4617.pdf; see also Mexican Migration Project,
PRINCEI-ON UNIV., http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2010) (provides more detailed information on these data).
34. We base the location information on the first and last trips of all adult migrant
workers who migrated to the U.S. in 1980 or later. For the twelve Mexican states
that are not in MMP, we assigned the location distributions of the neighboring
state deemed closest with regard to geographic proximity and most similar with
regard to demographic profile. Details are available on request.
35. The CPS wage is the median real-weekly wage of all workers aged 18-49 in the
merged outgoing rotation group files. Weekly wages under $100 were dropped
before taking the median. The CEW wage is the average real weekly wage for all
workers in private-sector industries covered by unemployment insurance.
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Appendix Tables 2 and 3 report first stage regressions and joint F-tests.
As indicated by the t-tests, the measures of U.S. wages and unemployment rates are generally statistically significant in the first stage regression of remittances on the instruments and other exogenous variables.
But, the instruments have more power in the regressions that do not include time fixed effects, as shown by the F-tests.
IV.

RESULTS

We find mixed evidence that remittances affect economic development.
Table 2 shows employment, wage, and unemployment effects of remittances for the OLS and 2SLS regressions on the full sample of Mexican
states in columns 1 and 2. The analysis for employment, wages, and unemployment is repeated on a smaller sample of central Mexican states in
Table 2, columns 3 and 4. This subsample of high-migration, high-remittance states excludes states in the north and southeast of Mexico, regions
where there is either little overall migration (in the wealthy states of the
north) or substantial domestic migration (in the southeast, where workers
migrate to the tourist areas on the Yucat~in peninsula). Columns 1 and 3
control for state fixed effects while columns 2 and 4 add time fixed effects. Our preferred specification is the 2SLS specification with time
fixed effects, but we caution that the panel is very short.
The OLS results in the top panel of Table 2 suggest that remittances
may affect employment and wages. In the sample of all states, higher
remittances appear to boost wages (column 1) and reduce employment
(column 2). A similar result holds for wages in high-migration states (column 3), while the estimated effect on employment switches from positive
to negative when time fixed effects are included. This suggests that good
macroeconomic conditions drove up both employment and remittances;
adding time effects controls for this omitted variable. The negative correlation between remittances and employment observed in columns 2 and 4
in both the full and high-migration samples can likely be attributed to the
endogenous nature of remittances and migration vis-A-vis employment
growth. Low-growth years are associated with higher out-migration and
more remittances. This is one of the reasons we turn to instrumental variables regressions.
When we instrument for remittances, as shown in the bottom panel of
Table 2, the employment and wage effects are positive when time fixed
effects are not included (columns 1 and 3). When time fixed effects are
included, however, there are no statistically significant results at conventional levels. There appear to be negative effects on the unemployment
rate in the sample of high-migration states (column 4), although the. coefficient lies just outside the standard cutoff p-value of 0.10. Still, the magnitude of the coefficient suggests that an additional $100 million in
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TABLE 2: EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE EFFECTS
OF REMIT[ANCES
Central States

All States
(j(2)
OLS
Ln(Employment)
Ln(Wages)
Unemployment rate
2SLS
Ln(Employment)
Ln( Wages)
Unemployment Rate
State fixed effects
Time fixed effects
No. of observations

(3)

(4)

-0.00
(0.01)
0.11 **
(0.03)
-0.08
(0.17)

-0.04**
(0.01)
0.01
(0.02)
-0.07
(0.19)

0.01 **
(0.00)
0.13**
(0.04)
-0.05
(0.16)

.02**
(0.01)
0.03
(0.03)
-0.20
(0.22)'

0.07**
(0.02)
0.35**
(0.08)
-0.06
(0.35)
Yes
No
640

-0.00
(0.04)
0.00
(0.07)
-0.97
(1.21)
Yes
Yes
640

0.05**
(0.02)
0.27**
(0.05)
0.08
(0.27)
Yes
No
420

-0.01
(0.04)
0.08
(0.07)
-1.95
(1.17)
Yes
Yes
420

Note: Each coefficient is from a separate regression of the quarterly state-level natural log of
employment or wages or the unemployment rate on remittances, FDI, and the labor force.
Regressions include time and state fixed effects as indicated. The second panel shows 2SLS
regressions where U.S. wages and unemployment rates are IWs for remittances. Columns 3 and
4 refer to the restricted sample of central states. Robust standard errors are clustered on the
state. Significance levels are denoted * p<0.i and ** p <0.05.

remittances in a quarter will reduce the unemployment rate by 1.95 percentage points. This is a large effect.
The fact that remittances do not increase employment but may lower
the unemployment rate suggests that the labor force may be shrinking.
Unemployed workers may leave the labor force or trade places with employed workers who choose to exit as remittances rise. Either way, the
results suggest that remittances do not cause the labor force to expand,
which is consistent with previous research.
Table 3 reports remittance effects on the wage distribution. The layout
of the results is the same as in Table 2. The OLS results indicate that
remittances shift the wage distribution to the right, with declines in the
share of workers who are earning less than one times the minimum wage
per day and significant increases in the share of workers earning either
two to three or three to five times the minimum wage per day. Remittances are generally not related to the share of workers who are top earners (more than five times the minimum wage), at least not in the presence
of time fixed effects. These workers are the most likely to be formalsector workers and the least likely to become international migrants or
receive remittances.
The distributional effects of remittances are enhanced in the 2SLS
specifications. As shown in the lower panel of Table 3, the coefficients on
remittances have the same signs as in the OLS specifications, but are
larger in magnitude. Focusing on column 4, remittances appear to shrink
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TABLE 3: WAGE DISTRIBUTION EFFECTS OF REMITTANCES
All States
OLS
Share earning !Si times MW
Share earning 1-2 times MW
Share earning 2-3 times MW
Share earning 3-5 times MW
Share earning >5 times MW
2SLS
Share earning 1l times MW
Share earning 1-2 times MW
Share earning 2-3 times MW
Share earning 3-5 times MW
Share earning >5 times MW
State fixed effects
Time fixed effects
No. of observations

Central States

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-1.01**
(0.47)
-0.26
(0.20)
0.25
(0.27)
0.85**
(0.19)
0.17
(0.16)

-0.97**
(0.45)
0.33
(0.30)
0.54
(0.32)
0.44**
(0.20)
-0.34
(0.25)

-4.11*
(0.57)
-~0.37**
(0.17)
0.17
(0.28)
0.97**
(0.20)
0.33**
(0.14)

-1.33**
(0.60)
0.22
(0.28)
0.78**
(0.36)
0.40
(0.25)
-0.07
(0.19)

-1.61**
(0.69)
-1.89**
(0.77)
-0.13
(0.57)
2.13**
(0.57)
1.51 **
(0.60)
Yes
No
160

-1.23
(1.05)
0.01
(1.03)
0.66
(0.83)
0.74
(0.54)
-0.18
(0.45)
Yes
Yes
160

-1.16*
(0.65)
-1.01*
(0.48)
-0.54
(0.57)
1.83**
(0.51)
0.88**
(0.29)
Yes
No
105

-2.62*
(1.38)
0.72
(0.85)
1.60*
(0.80)
0.45
(0.74)
-0.15
(0.61)
Yes
Yes
105

Note: Each coefficient is from a separate regression of the annual share of workers earning the
stated multiple of the federal minimum wage on remittances, 1713, and the labor force.
Regressions include time and state fixed effects as indicated. The second panel shows 2SLS
regressions where U.S. wages and unemployment rates are lVs for remittances. Columns 3 and
4 refer to the restricted sample of central states. Robust standard errors are clustered on the
state. Significance levels are denoted * p<O.1 and ** p <0.5

the fraction of workers earning at most the minimum wage by over two
percentage points and boost the share who earn two to three times the
minimum wage by 1.6 percentage points. As with the employment and
unemployment results, coefficients typically are larger in high-migration
states than in all states, and when not controlling for time fixed effects.
Since remittances primarily benefit poor households and non-tradable
sectors, such as food production and construction, it makes sense that
low-wage workers benefit disproportionately and are pushed up in the
wage distribution, particularly in heavily-affected states. Alternatively,
the lowest-wage workers may be disappearing from the wage distribution
if they leave the labor force as a consequence of receiving remittances.
Middle or positive selection of Mexican migrants may also help explain
some of the distributional consequences of remittances with regard to
wages. Workers who are most similar to the out-migrants are more likely
to receive remittances and to benefit from the reduced ranks in the labor
market. This may underlie part of the large increase in the share of the
workers earning wages of two to three times the minimum wage in highmigration states in the 25L5 specification.
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Table 4 shows the results from the school enrollment rate regressions
for the full sample and the high-migration subsample. In keeping with
much of the household-level evidence on remittances and schooling, we
find that, without time controls, remittances appear to increase enrollment rates at almost all levels of schooling. Remittances appear to be
positively and significantly correlated with higher primary, secondary,
and university enrollment rates in both the full sample of states and the
high-migration subsample. But once we include time fixed effects, the
remittance coefficients become statistically insignificant. This suggests
that remittances are increasing in the years during which enrollment rates
are also rising. The positive relationship is simply two concurrent trends,
remittance growth (as in Figure 1 supra) and the well-documented rise in
schooling in Mexico. Our state-level regressions do not indicate a causal
relationship between remittances and schooling. Given the complexity
underlying enrollment rates, more detailed data are likely needed to
identify the true effect of remittances on schooling.
TABLE 4: SCHOOL ENROLLMENT EFFECTS
OF REMITITANCES
Central States

All States
()(2)
OLS
Enrollment rate, primary
Enrollment rate, secondary
Enrollment rate, university

2SLS
Enrollment rate, primary
Enrollmient ratc, secondary
Enrollment rate, university
Enrollment rate, technical
State fixed effects
Time fixed effects
No. of observations

(4)

0.14

0.15

0.00

0.33*

(0.26)

(0.17)

(0.26)

0.46*
(0.23)
O.04**

0.01
(0.22)
-0.02

0.51 *
(0.28)
0.05**

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

0.02

-0.06

(0,02)
Enrollment rate, technical

(3)

0.02

-0.02

-0.21
(0.28)
-0.01

(0,03)

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.06)

0.79*
(0.41)
l.54**
(0.50)
0.17**
(0.06)
0.12
(0.08)
Yes
No
160

-0.35
(0.33)
0.89
(0.62)
-0.06
(0.06)
-0.13
(0.11)
Yes
Yes
160

0.63**
(0.29)
1.33**
(0.47)
0. 12**
(0.04)
0.12
(0.07)
Yes
No
105

-0.06
(0.32)
0.66
(0.94)
-0.05
(0.10)
-0.11
(0.13)
Yes
Yes
105

Note: Each coefficient is from a separate regression of annual state enrollment rate on
remittances, FDI, and the labor force. Regressions include time and state fixed effects as
indicated. The second panel shows 2SLS regressions where U.S. wages and unemployment rates
are lVs for remittances. Columns 3 and 4 refer to the restricted sample of central states. Robust
standard errors are clustered on the state. Significance levels are denoted * p<0.i and ** p
<0.05.
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CONCLUSION

A look at remittances in Mexican states suggests that they affect economic development. Higher remittances appear to reduce unemployment in high-migration states, although this result is weak. A longer time
series will likely bolster these findings. Still, the fact that remittances
lower unemployment, while not appreciably increasing employment, indicates there is either a zero or negative effect of remittances on the size of
the labor force. This result is consistent with a positive income effect of
remittances.
A more robust finding is the beneficial impact of remittances on the
wage distribution. Higher remittances lead to fewer low-wage workers in
high-migration states. Remittances appear to shift the wage distribution
up and bolster the middle of the wage distribution, either because of selective exits or demand-side effects.
We found no effect of remittances on school enrollment rates once we
controlled for time fixed effects. The beneficial schooling effects found in
previous research are not apparent in data at this level of aggregation.
Our failure to find enrollment effects could be due to using state-instead
of household-level data or could result from controlling for the endogeneity of remittances. Our findings suggest the need for further research on the effect of remittances on enrollment. This issue is
particularly important given that increases in educational attainment are
likely the best source of long-term economic growth for developing countries like Mexico.
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APPENDIX TABLE 1: DATA DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES
Variable
Remittances
Employment
Labor force
Unemployment rate
Foreign direct investment
Wage, median hourly
Percent of workers with
earnings in given interval

Enrollment rate, elementary & middle school
Enrollment rate, high
school
Enrollment rate, college
Enrollment rate, technical
school
U.S. wage, median
U.S. wage, mean
U.S. unemployment rate
Population
Consumer price index,
Mexico
Consumer price index,
United States

Description

Frequency

Hundreds of millions of
2007 dollars, deflated by
U.S. CPI-W
Thousands of jobs, SA;
quarterly (ENOE)
Thousands of people
(ENOE)
Open unemployment rate
(ENOE)
Millions of 2007 dollars,
SA, deflated by U.S. CPIU
Hourly wage in 2007 Q4
pesos, deflated by state
CPI and SA
Workers with earnings in
the given interval over all
paid workers; intervals
defined by multiples of the
federal minimum wage
(ENOE)
Enrollment over eligible
population (4-15 yrs old)

Quarterly

Banco de M6xico
www.banxico.org.mx

Quarterly

INEGI www.inegi.org.mx

Annually

INEGI www.inegi.org.mx

Quarterly

INEGI www.inegi.org.mx

Quarterly

Secretarfa de Economfa,
www.economia.gob.mx
(SIRNIE)
INEGI www.inegi.org.mx
(ENOE)

Quarterly

Source

Annually

INEGI www.inegi.org.mx

Annually

Segundo Informe, http://
www.informe.gob.mx
school (SEP)
Segundo Informe, http://
www.informe.gob.mx
school (SEP)
Segundo Informe, http://
www.informe.gob.mx

Annually
Enrollment over eligible
population (16-18 yrs old)
(SEP)
Annually
Enrollment over eligible
population (over 18 yrs
old) (SEP)
Annually
Enrollment over eligible
population (over 18 yrs
old) (SEP)
Median weekly earnings, in Quarterly
2007 Q4 dollars deflated by
CPI-W
Quarterly
Average weekly wages in
2007 Q4 dollars deflated by
CPI-W and SA (CEW)
Unemployed over labor
Quarterly
force (workers 16 and
over)
Midyear population estiAnnually
mate
Major city within state used Quarterly
as proxy for state
Quarterly
SA, Quarterly value is
monthly average

Segundo Informe, http://
www.informe.gob.mx
school
Current Population Survey,
Bureau of Labor Statistics,
www.bls.gov (CPS-ORG)
Covered Employment and
Wages, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, www.bls.gov
Current Population Survey,
Bureau of Labor Statistics,
www.bls.gov
Consejo Nacional de Poblacion, www.conapo.gop.mx
Banco de Mexico,
www.banxico.org.mx
Bureau of Labor Statistics,
www.bls.gov

Note: All variables at the state level unless otherwise noted. SA stands for seasonally adjusted.
IMSS-Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social
ENOE-Encuesta Nacional de Ocupaci6n y Empleo
INEGI-Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geograffa e Informdtica
SEP-Secretaria de Educaci6n P6blica
SIRNIE-Sistema de Informaci6n del Registro Nacional de Inversiones Extranjeras
CPS-ORG-Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Groups
CEW-Covered Employment and Wages
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APPENDIX TABLE 2: FIRST STAGE ESTIMATES OF THE
EFFECTS OF REMITT7ANCES ON ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, ALL STATES
All states (q)

Instrumental variable

All states (a)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

U.S. wage, CEW

0.002**
(.000)

-0.001**
(.000)

0.006
(.012)

O.050**
(.011)

U.S. wage, CPS

0.003**
(.001)

-0.001
(.001)

-0.020
(.017)

-0.040**
(.016)

O.287**
(.051)
13.10
(.000)
Yes
No
640

-0.220
(.152)
4.73
(.008)
Yes
Yes
640

-0.817**
(.273)
7.47
(.001)
Yes
No
160

-0.619
(.650)
7.67
(.001)
Yes
Yes
160

Remittance Equation

U.S. unemployment
F-test for joint significance
State fixed effects
Time fixed effects
No. of observations

Note: The table shows estimated coefficients from first stage regressions of remittances on U.S.
real weekly wages (from CEW and CPS) and unemployment rates and the F-statistic for the test
of joint significance of the instruments. All the regressions include FDI and the labor force, and
state and time fixed effects as indicated. Robust standard errors (p-value for the F-test) are
shown in parentheses; standard errors are clustered on the state. (q) indicates quarterly data and
(a) indicates annual data. Significance levels are denoted * p<0.i and ** p <0.05.

APPENDIX TABLE 3: FIRST STAGE ESTIMATES OF THE
EFFECTS OF REMITTANCES ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
CENTRAL STATES
Instrumental variable
Remittance Equation
U.S. wage, CEW
U.S. wage, CPS
U.S. unemployment
F-test for joint significance
State fixed effects
Time fixed effects
No. of observations

Central states (q)
(2)
(1)
-0.003**
(.001)
-0.005**
(.001)
-0.414**
(.066)
14.16
(.000)
Yes
No
420

-0.001
(.001)
-0.004**
(.001)
-0.135
(.228)
3.58
(.032)
Yes
Yes
420

Central states (a)
(4)
(3)
0.011
(.01)
-0.034**
(.016)
-0.946**
(.326)
8.40
(.001)
Yes
No
105

0.046**
(0.013)
-0.055**
(.016)
0.147
(.929)
4.99
(.010)
Yes
Yes
105

Note: The table shows estimated coefficients from first stage regressions of remittances on U.S.
real weekly wages (from CEW and CPS) and unemployment rates and the F-statistic for the test
of joint significance of the instruments. All the regressions include FDI and the labor force, and
state and time fixed effects as indicated. Robust standard errors (p-value for the F-test) are
shown in parentheses; standard errors are clustered on the state. (q) indicates quarterly data and
0
(a) indicates annual data. Significance levels are denoted * p< .1 and ** p <0.05.
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